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Layers of the Past: The Enemy Combatant Cases
by Peter E. Quint

I. Introduction
Cases involving the separation of powers between
Congress and the executive, and questions of presidential
power in general, were relatively rare in the Supreme Court
before the 1970s. Occasionally a case would come along -and sometimes it would be a spectacular case such as
Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer -- but these decisions
were relative rarities, hardly grist for the judicial mill.
This situation changed significantly in the 1970s, when
under the indirect impetus of executive adventurism in the
Vietnam War, and particularly in response to extended
claims of executive power advanced by the Nixon
administration, litigants and courts seemed to find it
increasingly appropriate to bring these cases to judicial
decision.
It seems a fair bet that the importance and frequency
of cases of this nature will only increase in the twentyfirst century. War, terrorism, and environmental disaster
seem to be high on the agenda in our new millennium, and
issues of this kind are likely to evoke broad claims of
executive power in response. Accordingly, the proper role
and limits of the powers of the President are likely to
move to the forefront of constitutional issues, in a manner
not seen since the Nixon period (and perhaps not even
then).
With the recent appointments of Chief Justice Roberts
and Justice Alito, we may now be at a turning point in the
history of the court’s doctrines on the separation of
powers. But on this sort of question, particularly, it is
of course perilous to try to predict the future.
Yet, according to the ideology of the common law at
least, the past to some extent determines the present and
the future. Of course there are multiple layers of the
past and, with a jurisprudence that now extends back over
more than two centuries, the Supreme Court has a certain
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ability to choose the particular layer of the past that it
wishes to adopt for the present.
The Court’s most recent pronouncements on executive
power were handed down in cases decided in 2004 on the
President’s authority to hold individuals in military
custody, as “enemy combatants”. These decisions represent
one layer of the -- quite recent -- past. But the opinions
in these cases, in turn, rely on doctrines suggested by a
range of earlier cases, including decisions that extend
back to the middle of the nineteenth century, or earlier.
As a kind of curtain raiser, therefore, to what seem likely
to be some of the most important and difficult
constitutional problems of the near future, it might be
useful to try to take a synoptic view of these 2004 cases,
as recent history, as well as the cases representing layers
of earlier history on which these decisions may rely.
II. Four types of arguments.
When some form of Presidential action is challenged
before a court, the Executive typically has a number of
arguments that may be deployed in response. The first
argument is that the courts have no business adjudicating
the question at all, because the plaintiffs have raised a
“political” question or because the matter is not
justiciable for some other reason. According to the second
argument, even if the case is justiciable, the President
may claim authority that proceeds directly from the
Constitution itself -- whether that authority is “inherent”
or expressly stated in the constitutional text. The third
argument is that, even though the President may not have
direct constitutional authority, some statute of Congress
(or perhaps a treaty) should be interpreted to grant the
President the authority that he is asserting. In addition
to these arguments, implicating aspects of the separation
of powers, the President may also have to confront claims
that individual rights prevent the President’s action, even
if it is authorized by Congress.
In the enemy combatant cases, the President made
arguments in all of these categories. In these categories,
cases from various layers of the past furnished principles
that could be used on each side of the respective issues.
The Court’s response was decidedly mixed.
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III. The 2004 Cases.
After the attacks on September 11, 2001, Congress
enacted a Joint Resolution authorizing the President to
respond with the use of “all necessary and appropriate
force”. Thereafter, alleged hostile fighters -- “enemy
combatants” -- were captured on the “battlefield” in
Afghanistan or arrested elsewhere in the world. Among
these detainees were sixteen individuals, allegedly
adherents of Al Qaeda, the Taliban or similar groups, whose
petitions for habeas corpus were ultimately considered by
the Supreme Court in the 2004 cases. These were: Yaser
Hamdi, an American citizen who was apparently seized during
a battle in Afghanistan; Jose Padilla, also a citizen of
the United States, who was arrested in an airport in
Chicago after flights from Pakistan and Switzerland; and
fourteen citizens of Australia and Kuwait who were being
held with many other noncitizens at the American base in
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The habeas corpus petitions claimed
that military detention by the United States, or the
circumstances of that detention, were unlawful.
In Hamdi’s case, a majority of the Supreme Court found
that the military detention of a citizen in Hamdi’s
position was lawful, if he was indeed an “enemy combatant”.
But the Court also found that Hamdi was constitutionally
entitled to a hearing before a “neutral decisionmaker” on
the question of his status as an “enemy combatant”.1 Rather
than proceed to such a hearing, the Government entered into
an agreement with Hamdi, by which he renounced his American
citizenship and was allowed to return to Saudi Arabia.
In Padilla’s case, the Court found that the habeas
corpus petition had been improperly filed in New York and
therefore must be dismissed.2 The petition was then
properly refiled in South Carolina, and the case began to
work its way again up the appellate ladder. Questions with
respect to Padilla’s military detention may be heard by the
Supreme Court this year.
In the case of the noncitizens (Rasul), the Supreme
Court found that noncitizen detainees in Guantanamo Bay are
entitled to file petitions for habeas corpus -- but what
1

Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
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Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004).
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rights these detainees may have (if any) were deferred for
future decision.3 Subsequently, Congress has enacted a
statute purporting to deny federal jurisdiction to consider
habeas corpus and other petitions of noncitizen detainees
at Guantanamo Bay in most circumstances. Whether this
statute should be interpreted to deny habeas corpus
remedies to detainees already at Guantanamo Bay (instead of
future detainees only), and questions relating to the
constitutionality of the statute, remain undecided.
As noted, the Court, in the 2004 cases, considered a
range of arguments on the question of Presidential
authority, and the various opinions of justices wound their
way through several layers of decisions of the past in
order to reach their conclusions on this important
contemporary problem.

IV. Layers of the Past
A. Marbury v. Marbury. Arguably, the case that played
the most important role in the three “enemy combatant”
decisions was a case that was hardly cited at all in any of
the opinions -- Marbury v. Madison. In addition to its
famous holding on judicial review of legislation, Chief
Justice Marshall’s opinion in Marbury also declared -- in
strong dictum -- that the judges are authorized to order
executive officials to comply with their legal duty. The
extent of judicial authority over the power of the
executive lies at the heart of the enemy combatant cases,
and therefore a principle advanced in Marbury must
certainly play a role.
But there is also a competing principle in the Marbury
opinion itself that can take us in the opposite direction.
Chief Justice Marshall was anxious to make clear that he
was not claiming a general supervisory role over President
Jefferson and his cabinet. Accordingly, he disclaims
judicial authority over “political” subjects, which are
confided to “executive discretion.”
Within Marshall’s opinion in Marbury, therefore, we
find two opposing principles. In appropriate
circumstances, the courts must review legislative and
3

Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
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executive action, but, if the “subject” in issue is
“political”, judicial review must stop. The question, of
course, is where and how this line should be drawn.
The line sketched by Marshall is by no means entirely
clear, and it may not precisely foreshadow the contours of
the modern “political question” doctrine. Yet Marshall
seems to rely here -- as elsewhere in the opinion -- on the
concept of “law”, as known to courts. If the law imposes
an obligation on the executive in favor of an individual -such as Madison’s legal obligation to deliver the
commission to Marbury -- the court should order the
executive to comply with the law. But if the law or the
Constitution leaves a subject within the executive’s
discretion -- as it does, for example, on the question of
whom to appoint as Justice of the Peace for the District of
Columbia or whether or not to negotiate a treaty with
France -- there is no legal obligation imposed on the
executive and accordingly, there is no opportunity for the
Court to intervene. Of course the joker is that the Court
decides in each case whether the “subject” falls into one
category or the other.
In Marbury it was a statute (the District of Columbia
Organic Act of 1801, as interpreted by Marshall) that gave
the claimant a right to his commission. In the enemy
combatant cases, in contrast, it is the Constitution that
may impose limitations on the executive in favor of
individuals. Since both a statute and the Constitution are
forms of “law”, this should not make any real difference on
the question of judicial power. Yet the executive could
argue that the open texture of the Constitution, in a time
of “war on terrorism”, is much more likely to yield
“subjects” of executive discretion than the narrowlyfocused statutory provision litigated in Marbury in a time
of domestic peace.
Yet in the enemy combatant cases, at the outset at
least, the Court clearly comes down on the side of judicial
review and gives the rhetorical back of its hand to the
claim that the “subject” is political and the courts should
not intervene. Therefore the overarching principle of
judicial review prevails -- at several crucial points -over the “political question doctrine” (or a facsimile
thereof) in these enemy combatant cases.
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Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion in Hamdi contains
the most impressive statement of this general position.
The Government had argued for extensive deference to the
executive’s decision that Hamdi was an enemy combatant.
But O’Connor responded that we “necessarily reject the
Government’s assertion that separation of powers principles
mandate a heavily circumscribed role for the courts”4 under
the circumstances. The Government’s view that the courts
should ignore “the individual case and focus exclusively on
the legality of the broader detention scheme cannot be
mandated by any reasonable view of separation of powers, as
this approach serves only to condense power into a single
branch of government.” O’Connor continued:
We have long since made clear that a state of war
is not a blank check for the President when it
comes to the rights of the Nation’s citizens.
Youngstown... [The Constitution] most assuredly
envisions a role for all three branches when
individual liberties are at stake.... Likewise...
the Great Writ of habeas corpus allows the
Judicial Branch to play a necessary role in
maintaining this delicate balance of governance,
serving as an important judicial check on the
Executive’s discretion in the realm of
detentions... [I]t would turn our system of
checks and balances on its head to suggest that a
citizen could not make his way to court with a
challenge to the factual basis for his detention
by his government, simply because the Executive
opposes making available such a challenge....”5
In contrast, Justice Thomas took a substantially different
position on this issue, emphasizing “our own institutional
inability to weigh competing concerns correctly”6 and
declaring that “we lack the information and expertise to
question whether Hamdi is actually an enemy combatant, a
question the resolution of which is committed to other
branches.”7
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542 U.S. 507, 535 (2004).
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Id. at 536-37.
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Id. at 585-86.
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In the companion Rasul case, which considers whether
habeas corpus is available to the noncitizens detained at
Guantanamo, Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion makes
clear that this complex problem also poses the “political”
question issue of Marbury -- the question of how authority
should be allocated between the judiciary and the
executive. Kennedy points out that in the earlier
Eisentrager case, involving asserted habeas corpus rights
of prisoners abroad8, the Court rejected the petition
because it “was not within the proper realm of the judicial
power. It concerned matters within the exclusive province
of the Executive, or the Executive and Congress, to
determine...”9
Indeed, in a passage that accords well with Marshall’s
distinction in Marbury, Kennedy acknowledges that “military
necessity” and other factors create a zone of executive (or
executive and congressional) discretion where law enforced
by courts does not run; accordingly, “there is a realm of
political authority over military affairs where the
judicial power may not enter. The existence of this realm
acknowledges the power of the President as Commander in
Chief, and the joint role of the President and the
Congress, in the conduct of military affairs.”10 So the
question that the Court must answer in Rasul -- through
technical argumentation relating to the proper
interpretation of the habeas corpus statute and related
constitutional principles -- is where to draw the line
between possible judicial power and free executive and
(perhaps congressional) discretion.
But, Kennedy concludes, the circumstances indicate
that the Rasul case does not fall within that political
zone and that there must be “circumstances in which the
courts maintain the power and the responsibility to protect
persons from unlawful detention even when military affairs
are implicated.”11 In this case, the status of Guantanamo
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Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
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Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 486 (2004).
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Id. at 487.
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Id. (citing Ex parte Milligan).
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Bay as “in every practical respect a United States
territory... far removed from any hostilities,”12 as well as
the petitioners’ “[i]ndefinite detention without trial or
other proceeding”, over a long period, “suggests a weaker
case of military necessity and much greater alignment with
the traditional function of habeas corpus.”13
In sum, in Kennedy’s opinion in Rasul, as in
O’Connor’s plurality opinion in Hamdi, the judiciary’s
function as a protector of individual rights prevails over
claims of extensive executive discretion.14 By granting the
claimant some rights -- the right to a form of hearing in
Hamdi and the right to file habeas corpus in Rasul -- the
majority judges agree with this position. In Hamdi and
Rasul, therefore, the judicial review principle of Marbury
prevails over the “political” question doctrine that is
also outlined in Marshall’s famous opinion.
B. Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. the Prize Cases.
The writ of habeas corpus -- the writ that was sought
in Hamdi, Rasul, and Padilla -- tests whether the executive
has followed the steps that are necessary, under relevant
principles of law, to justify holding an individual in
custody. Accordingly, at the heart of the concept of
habeas corpus lies the concept of due process of law.
The procedural aspects of due process of law -- for
example, the nature of a required hearing, the opportunity
to present a defense, etc. -- are considered at some length
in these cases. But first, the Court must examine an even
more fundamental question of due process: is there an
underlying legal rule that can justify holding the
individual? Without such an underlying norm, there can be
no detention of an individual. If there is no valid norm
12

Id. at 487.
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Id. at 488.
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Suggesting a similar distinction, but reaching a
different conclusion, Justice Scalia (dissenting) in effect
deplores the result of Rasul which might “have the
consequence of bringing the cumbersome machinery of our
domestic courts into military affairs.” Scalia at 506.
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declaring that a particular activity justifies detention,
an individual may not be detained no matter how excellent
the procedure is for determining that the individual has
performed that activity.
Any valid detention of an individual as an enemy
combatant must rest ultimately on the adoption of a valid
legal rule holding that enemy combatants may be detained
under these circumstances. But who has the authority to
adopt this legal rule?
Unlike the previous question, which implicated the
allocation of authority between the judiciary and the
“political branches” (particularly the executive), this
question involves the allocation of authority between the
President and Congress. The Constitution confers authority
on Congress to “declare war”, to take many other specific
steps with respect to armies, navies, and militias, and to
make all laws that are “necessary and proper” for carrying
out those powers.15 On the other hand, Article II “vests”
the executive power in the President and declares that the
President shall be “Commander in Chief of the Army and the
Navy”. For several decades, moreover, presidents have
claimed broad “inherent authority” relating to war.
One strong concept of due process of law requires that
fundamental norms must ordinarily be made by legislative
decision. This concept was strikingly captured by Justice
Jackson in what might be called the peroration of his
opinion in the Steel Seizure Case: “With all its defects,
delays and inconveniences, men have discovered no technique
for long preserving free government except that the
Executive be under the law, and the law be made by
parliamentary deliberations.”16. On the other hand, the
Bush Administration has followed other recent
administrations in claiming direct constitutional authority
-- without the necessity of congressional authorization -to enter United States forces into hostilities and to take
foreign and domestic steps related to those hostilities.
Two cases that seem to look in different directions on
the scope of presidential and congressional power in war
time are the Korean War case of Youngstown Sheet & Tube v.
15

U.S. Const. art. I §8 cl. 11; cl. 10, 12-17; cl. 18.

16

343 U.S. 579, 655 (1952) (emphasis added).
9

Sawyer, and the Prize Cases, decided during the Civil War.
In Youngstown President Truman ordered the seizure of the
Nation’s steel mills, in order to resolve a labor dispute
that threatened war production. Striking down the
president’s order, Justice Black’s majority opinion
declared that the seizure order was actually a form of lawmaking that fell within the power of Congress and was not
confided to the Executive. A number of the concurring
justices emphasized that Congress had manifested its
disapproval of a seizure remedy in these circumstances;
therefore the President’s authority was at its “lowest
ebb”. Overall, however, the majority justices seemed to
accept the fundamental view that -- even when foreign
affairs may be seriously affected -- basic policy-making
authority generally falls within the realm of Congress and
not within that of the executive.
But the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence contains at
least one eminent counter-weight to Youngstown. In the
Prize Cases of 1863, the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of a naval blockade imposed by President
Lincoln, without congressional authority, at the outset of
the Civil War. (The blockade was later ratified by
Congress.) Although Justice Grier’s majority opinion
places some weight on subsequent congressional
ratification, it essentially found that the President’s
unilateral imposition of the blockade was directly
authorized by his constitutional power as commander in
chief of the Army and the Navy.17 Indeed Justice Thomas,
dissenting in Hamdi, cites a passage from the Prize Cases
for the view “that the President has constitutional
authority to protect the national security and that this
authority carries with it broad discretion.”18
Thus, where Youngstown plainly favors congressional
power in certain contexts relating to war, the Prize Cases
favor unilateral presidential power in the circumstances of
that case. Accordingly, one question suggested by the 2004
enemy combatant cases is whether the executive detentions
at issue in those cases are closer to the Congressional
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See Prize Cases, 2 Black 635, 670.
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Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 581 (2004).
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realm of Youngstown or to the Executive realm of the Prize
Cases.
In fact, we do not get a clear answer to this
question, as a majority of the Supreme Court finds that
congressional authorization is actually present (see
section 3 below). In avoiding a statement on “direct”
presidential authority, the court was following its
practice in Ex parte Quirin, an earlier decision on the
related question of military commissions, which also
ultimately found that Congress had authorized the
presidential action. Even in the realm of foreign affairs,
the court in recent years has shown some reluctance to
grant direct constitutional power to the President.19 This
may be a continuing legacy of reactions to extended claims
of executive power common in the Vietnam era.
In any event, in the “enemy combatant” cases, the
Youngstown decision seems to have held its own. As noted,
even in finding authorization for the President’s detention
of enemy combatants, the plurality justices carefully avoid
arguments of direct or “inherent” Presidential authority
under Article II. Moreover, Justice Souter (joined by
Ginsburg) went out of his way to note “the weakness of the
Government’s mixed claim of inherent, extrastatutory
authority under a combination of Article II of the
Constitution and the usages of war.” Souter added that,
“it is instructive to recall Justice Jackson’s observation
that the President is not Commander in Chief of the
country, only of the military.”20 Clarence Thomas, who also
found congressional authority, was the only justice who
seemed to be willing to find direct presidential authority
for holding Hamdi.
The opinions of the Second Circuit in the Padilla
case, give us a somewhat fuller exposition of the tension
between the Prize Cases and Youngstown in this area.21
Recall that in Padilla, an American citizen was held as an
enemy combatant after having been arrested at an American
airport following flights from Pakistan and Switzerland.
19

See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
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542 U.S. at 552 (citing Youngstown.)
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Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2nd Cir. 2003).
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One member of the three judge panel relied on the Prize
Cases in indicating that the President had inherent
authority to hold Padilla:
As I read The Prize Cases, it is clear that
common sense and the Constitution allow the Commanderin-Chief to protect the nation when met with
belligerency and to determine what degree of
responsive force is necessary... The Prize Cases
demonstrate that congressional authorization is not
necessary for the Executive to exercise his
constitutional authority to prosecute armed conflicts
when, as on September 11, 2001, the United States is
attacked.22
The judge rejects the relevance of Youngstown on the
grounds that the relationship between the threatened steel
strike and the war in Korea “was far too attenuated”, in
comparison with Padilla in which the President’s action is
“directly tied to his responsibilities as commander-inchief.”23
Rejecting these arguments, the two majority judges
found that Padilla’s case involved “domestic abridgments of
individual liberties” and therefore Youngstown applied.24
According to these judges, it followed that congressional
authorization was necessary under Youngstown before an
American citizen could be held under such circumstances,
and that any “inherent” powers that the President might
have on the battlefield did not extend to these internal
actions. The prevailing judges also rejected the
application of the Prize Cases, on the ground that the
“inherent constitutional authority” established there
involved “the capture of enemy property -- not the
detention of persons” as in the Padilla case.25

22

352 F.3d at 727-28 (opinion of Wesley, C.J.). Judge
Wesley also found congressional authority in this case.
23

Id. at 727.
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Id. at 714 (opinion of Pooler and B.D. Parker, Jr.).
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Id. at 717.
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C. Dames & Moore v. Endo. The tension between the
Steel Seizure Case and the Prize Cases reflects uncertainty
in the allocation of “war powers” between Congress and the
Executive. But even if a requirement of congressional
authorization is assumed, the underlying tension tends to
reemerge at the next level of analysis: If there is a
congressional statute that may conceivably be interpreted
to authorize the executive’s actions, the Court must decide
whether Congress has authorized the action with adequate
specificity. If the Court is wiling to infer broad
authorization from general language, such a technique
favors extensive policy-making by the executive. On the
other hand, a requirement of explicit congressional
authorization limits executive discretion and favors closer
congressional control of actions related to war.
This was a question of great importance in the Hamdi
case because the AUMF -- the statute that was enacted in
response to the attacks of September 11 -- authorizes the
President to enter into hostilities in very general terms.
A question that divided the Justices, therefore, was
whether authority for the military detention of citizens
could be found in the broad language of the AUMF -- or
whether more specific legislative authorization should be
required.
What technique of statutory interpretation should be
used in a case like Hamdi? In some instances, the Supreme
Court has indicated that, in cases of foreign affairs
emergencies, the Court should go as far as it can to find a
form of congressional authorization -- even to the point of
finding “implicit” authorization in statutes that may come
close, but do not actually support the executive’s action.
This technique of authorization by analogy, notably
employed by the court in Dames & Moore v. Regan, could also
support a court in pushing as far as possible to find
actual authorization within general statutory language.
Such a view seems to be advanced, for example, by Justice
Thomas in his dissenting opinion in Hamdi. Thomas cites
Dames & Moore frequently, for the proposition that -- in
foreign affairs -- the action of the President is
“supported by the strongest of presumptions and the widest
latitude of judicial interpretation.”26

26

542 U.S. at 584 (quoting Dames & Moore).
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Quite a different position, however, is suggested by
the case of Ex parte Endo. This case arose out of the
tragic forced removal of thousands of individuals of
Japanese ancestry, both citizens and non-citizens, from the
West Coast of the United States during World War II. In
Hirabayashi and Korematsu, the Court found clear statutory
authorization for orders requiring persons of Japanese
ancestry to leave the West Coast of the United States.
Ms. Endo was an American citizen who had been required
to leave the West Coast pursuant to this program; moreover,
notwithstanding a finding that she was “loyal”, the
Government held her in detention in a “relocation center”
in Utah. Granting a writ of habeas corpus, the Supreme
Court unanimously ordered that Endo be freed from
detention. Because important rights of liberty were
involved, the Court imposed a very stringent requirement of
explicit authorization; the Court found that because
detentions were not specifically mentioned in the relevant
statute, there was no Congressional authorization.27
In Hamdi, Justice Souter (joined by Justice Ginsburg)
relied on Ex parte Endo in arguing that there was no
statutory authority for the military detention of American
citizens like Hamdi. According to Souter, the
“interpretive regime” of Endo required a “clear statement”;
Souter quoted language from Endo requiring that, for
detention of citizens during wartime, “no greater
restraint” should be allowed “than was clearly and
unmistakably indicated by the language” of the statute.
Moreover, the Non-Detention Act “meant to require a
congressional enactment that clearly authorized detention
or imprisonment.”28
In sum, Souter argued that the AUMF did not authorize
the detention of a citizen like Hamdi, because
“like the statute discussed in Endo, [the AUMF] never
so much as uses the word detention, and there is no
reason to think Congress might have perceived any need
to augment Executive power to deal with dangerous
27

Similarly, a Presidential executive order did not mention
detentions and thus also provided no authorization.
28

Id. at 544.
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citizens within the United States, given the wellstocked statutory arsenal of defined criminal offenses
covering the gamut of actions that a citizen
sympathetic to terrorists might commit.29
In finding that the AUMF provided congressional
authorization for the military detention of a citizen like
Hamdi, O’Connor’s plurality opinion cited neither Dames &
Moore, on the one side, nor Ex parte Endo, on the other.
Rather, the Court found that
“the AUMF is explicit congressional authorization for
the detention of... individuals who fought against the
United States in Afghanistan as part of the Taliban...
[D]entention of [those] individuals... for the
duration of the particular conflict in which they were
captured, is so fundamental and accepted an incident
to war as to be an exercise of the ‘necessary and
appropriate force’ Congress has authorized the
President to use [in the Force Resolution].”30
Moreover, there “is no bar to this Nation’s holding one of
its own citizens as an enemy combatant”, as the Court had
in effect previously concluded in Ex parte Quirin.31 Thus,
the plurality ignores the narrowing interpretation
suggested by Endo and, necessarily, adopts a somewhat
broader view of the appropriate interpretation of
congressional authorization to the President. Yet, on the
other hand, O’Connor’s plurality opinion does cast some
doubt on whether the AUMF can be interpreted to allow
indefinite military detention of enemy combatants, as the
Government claimed. In seeking to sketch out some
limitations -- based on the novel circumstances of the
present conflict -- O’Connor seems to take a somewhat more
restrained view than that suggested by Justice Thomas.32
29

Id. at 547. In dissent, Justice Scalia (joined by
Stevens) agrees with Souter that the AUMF does not
authorize “detention of a citizen... with the clarity
necessary to comport with cases such as Ex parte Endo...
and Duncan v. Kahanamoku” or with the Non-Detention Act.
Id. at 574.
30

Id. at 517-18.
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Id. at 519.
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542 U.S. at 521.
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Indeed Thomas seems to draw, from the principles of Dames &
Moore, an authority to hold enemy combatants even after
active hostilities have concluded.33
In the Padilla case, the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit also invoked Ex parte Endo, and the NonDetention Act, to impose a requirement of explicit
statutory authorization and to find that Padilla’s military
detention was not authorized by the AUMF. In the view of
the Second Circuit, Padilla’s case could be distinguished
from Hamdi on the grounds that -- although both were
citizens of the United States -- Hamdi was captured on the
battlefield in Afghanistan, whereas Padilla was arrested in
an airport in the United States. The Second Circuit’s
opinion was vacated by the Supreme Court, which found that
Padilla’s petition for habeas corpus was improperly filed
in New York. But after the petition was properly filed in
South Carolina, the District Court also cited Endo in
finding that the AUMF did not authorize Padilla’s detention
-- although that decision was in turn reversed by the
Fourth Circuit.
D. Individual Rights: Milligan and Endo v. Quirin,
Korematsu & Eisentrager. Cutting across -- and influencing
-- the arguments on the separations of powers were issues
relating to the constitutional rights (if any) of the
detainees, whether citizens or aliens. The parties
advanced rather absolute views on this subject. The
Government argued (and, indeed, continues to argue) that
enemy combatants essentially have no rights under the
American Constitution. In contrast, the detainees argued
that they are entitled to procedural safeguard resembling
those of an ordinary criminal trial.
The few relevant prior decisions of the Supreme Court
also propounded fairly definitive views -- on both sides.
Favoring an expansive view of rights we find the Civil War
case of Ex parte Milligan, as well as the World War II case
of Ex parte Endo, discussed above. On the other side,
advancing a view of rights as narrow or nonexistent in this
context are three other cases arising during World War II:

33

Justice Thomas’s opinion did, however, provide the fifth
vote for a finding that Hamdi’s military detention was
authorized by the AUMF. Id. at 587-88.
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Ex parte Quirin, Korematsu v. United States, and Johnson v.
Eisentrager.
In the post-Civil War case of Ex parte Milligan, the
Court granted the habeas corpus petition of an Indiana
citizen who had been convicted by a military commission for
aiding the Confederate cause. The Court found than an
American citizen, who was not a member of the armed forces,
could not constitutionally be tried by military tribunal -even in time of war -- if the individual was not a citizen
of a seceding state and resided in an area in which the
civil courts were open and operating. Milligan has been
considered a bulwark of civil liberty in the United States:
a famous German writer, at the time a refugee from Nazi
Germany, has written that it is the Milligan case that
prevents the American government from erecting a Nazi-type
“dual state” -- a state in which a relatively normal
jurisdiction of the civil courts is accompanied by a
parallel lawless military or Gestapo system.34
Milligan was qualified, however, by Ex parte Quirin,
which considered the cases of German soldiers who, after
being trained as saboteurs, entered the United States from
German submarines during World War II. Speedily arrested,
they were tried and convicted of war crimes by a military
tribunal. The Supreme Court upheld these military
convictions, even though one of the German soldiers claimed
American citizenship, and even though the saboteurs were
tried in an area (Washington, D.C.) in which the civil
courts were open and functioning. Milligan was
distinguished on the grounds that the saboteurs were
“belligerents”, actual members of an enemy armed force.
Strictly speaking, neither Milligan nor Quirin was
applicable to the problem of the “enemy combatants”,
because those cases considered the permissibility of trial
by a military commission, and not the question of military
detention without trial.35 Yet the government argued that
34

Ernst Fraenkel, The Dual State 156 (1941). According to
Fraenkel, when “during the Civil War, a dual state seemed
imminent, the Supreme Court halted the development. In Ex
parte Milligan, Justice Davis upheld the Rule of Law [and
stated]: ‘... Martial Law can never exist where the courts
are open, and in the proper and unobstructed exercise of
their jurisdiction.’”
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the implications of Quirin push toward recognition of broad
military authority to hold “enemy combatants” (whether
aliens or citizens), while counsel for the detainees argued
that Milligan supported strong rights of due process, at
least for citizens held within the United States or
territories under its control.
In some ways, the decision in Korematsu36 seems like a
grotesque reverse variation on Ex parte Milligan. During
World War II, thousands of individuals of Japanese origin
(both citizens and aliens) were removed from the West Coast
of the United States by the American military, pursuant to
statutory authorization. The Government claimed that these
individuals posed a risk of sabotage and espionage. Even
though the Supreme Court conceded that classifications
based on race or ethnicity are “immediately suspect” and
deserve “the most rigid scrutiny”, the Court upheld these
massive removals on the basis of military necessity. The
Court reached this conclusion even though the ordinary
civil and criminal courts were open and functioning and
were therefore well able to try any individual accused of
sabotage, espionage or other criminal offense. Unlike
Milligan, this case is, needless to say, not considered a
bulwark of American liberty; rather it is now generally
acknowledged to have been an inexcusable disaster.37
The Court attempted to recover its equilibrium in Ex
parte Endo, a companion case decided the same day as
Korematsu, in which (as we have seen) the Court found that
there was no statutory or presidential authorization for
continued detention of loyal citizens removed from the West
Coast and held in “relocation centers” in the interior.
Finally, in Johnson v. Eisentrager38, the Supreme Court
found that German aliens, who had been convicted of war
crimes by an American military commission in China and were
serving their sentences in Germany, had no right to file a
petition of habeas corpus in an American court.

35

Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 567 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

36

Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).

37

See, e.g., Rostow, “The Japanese American Cases -- A
Disaster”, 54 Yale L.J. 489 (1945).
38

339 U.S. 763 (1950).
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As noted above, these cases yield rather definite
results, on both sides. In Milligan and Endo, the result
was the detainee’s immediate release from military custody.
In Eisentrager, in contrast, the result was continued
detention, without any rights to additional process; and
the result in Korematsu was that the removal program was
upheld, again without any requirement of additional
process. (We have seen, however, that the actual military
detention of loyal citizens could not be sustained.)
Finally, in Ex parte Quirin, the Court sets its face
against the arguments of the German saboteurs and was
unwilling to grant rights for any additional process.
In Hamdi four judges argued for a form of definitive
result along the lines of Milligan or Endo. In an
extraordinary dissent, Justice Scalia (joined by Stevens)
argued that American citizens, who were not members of the
armed forces, could not be tried by military commission and
thus must either be released or remitted to the civil
authorities for criminal trial39; in making this argument,
Scalia relied upon Ex parte Milligan, and minimized the
force and applicability of Quirin. In Scalia’s view,
Congress could only change this result by suspending the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. As we have seen,
Justices Souter and Ginsburg reached a similar result by
emphasizing the clear statement principle of Ex parte Endo.
But the plurality of the Court -- joined by Souter and
Ginsberg, for the purposes of making a clear majority40 -reached an intermediate position. The plurality rejected
the definitive views on both sides -- the government’s view
that the enemy combatants had very little in the way of due
process rights and Scalia’s view that civilian citizens
cannot be held in military custody without a suspension of
the writ of habeas corpus. Instead the plurality found
that citizens could constitutionally be held as enemy
combatants in military custody, but that constitutional
rights of due process require a special form of hearing
before a “neutral decisionmaker” to determine the question
of whether the individual is indeed an enemy combatant.
This hearing also requires adequate notice and opportunity
to be heard, although principles of evidence and the burden
of persuasion may be relaxed in favor of the Government.
39

Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 554-79.
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Id. at 553.
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This hearing is a minimum requirement of due process,
determined by the plurality through a careful weighing of
the contending interests. It is possible that the Court in
Rasul implicitly imposes such a requirement for noncitizen
detainees as well, although this point is less clear.
IV.

Conclusion

Although we cannot predict the future, we can try to
make sense of the past. In the 2004 enemy combatant cases,
the Court confronted a number of issues on which prior
cases, or principles drawn from prior cases, seemed to
point in different directions. The Court resolved these
tensions, at least provisionally, in the following manner.
1. Marbury v. Marbury. In cases involving the rights
of individuals, even in wartime, the Court is unwilling to
accord total deference to the decisions of the Executive
and Congress. Accordingly, the political question doctrine
is not available for the purpose of excluding judicial
review of important questions concerning the rights of
alleged enemy combatants detained by the United States
military; rather, the courts must retain a significant
role. Thus, in the 2004 cases, the judicial review strand
of Marbury clearly prevails over the political question
aspect of that case.
2. Youngstown v. the Prize Cases. On the tension
between the congressional primacy of Youngstown and the
direct presidential power of the Prize Cases, the Court did
not make a clear choice. In the 2004 cases the Court did
not find direct presidential authority -- but neither did
it state that congressional authorization of detention was
constitutionally required. Overall, however, the
congressional principle of Youngstown seems at least to be
holding its own. In Hamdi, four of the nine justices
indicated that congressional authorization for the military
detention of citizens was necessary -- and did not find
that authorization. Another four justices rested on a
finding of congressional authorization, without taking a
position on whether direct presidential authority was
present. Only one justice seemed to indicate a strong view
that -- as the Government argued -- military detention of
citizens was directly authorized by the President’s power
under Article II.
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3. Dames & Moore v. Endo. On the question of the
second level of tension between executive and congressional
power -- the question of the interpretative technique to be
applied to statutes possibly authorizing executive action - the Court seems to tilt a bit in the direction of the
President. Certainly the plurality in Hamdi tacitly
rejects the clear statement principle of Ex parte Endo,
although it does not explicitly adopt the technique of
extended authorization propounded in Dames & Moore; and the
Court also raises some doubt about authorizing an
indefinite detention that could extend far into the future.
Yet, in Hamdi, five justices find congressional
authorization when (as Souter’s opinion shows) there are
strong arguments to the contrary.
4. Individual rights: Milligan etc. v. Quirin etc. On
the question of individual rights in Hamdi, the Court
rejects definitive positions on either side and adopts a
nuanced and, indeed, rather modest approach. Instead of
deferring to the executive’s judgment (as the Government
argued) or ordering Hamdi’s immediate release from military
detention (as Scalia and Stevens would require), the Court
balances Hamdi’s liberty interests against the Government’s
security interests and devises a nuanced procedural regime.
Detainees challenging their status as enemy combatants may
present their case before a “neutral decisionmaker” -although a “presumption” in favor of the Government’s
evidence will probably make it difficult for a detainee to
prevail in the end. Similarly, the Court in Rasul rejected
the Government’s argument that habeas corpus could not be
filed by noncitizens held at Guantanamo -- thus also
rejecting what would certainly have been a clear and
definitive result. We do not know what rights the
noncitizen detainees ultimately will have (if any). But at
least one lower court has found that hearings of the nature
of those accorded in the Hamdi case are constitutionally
required for noncitizens as well.
A Further Condensation: Whether or not the general
principles of the 2004 cases may be applicable to the
future, a further condensation of these principles could be
stated as follows: On the one hand the Court will strive to
stay involved in separations of powers questions relating
to individual rights, even in wartime, and it may be
reluctant to find direct constitutional authority for
significant presidential actions. On the other hand, the
Court will probably be generous in finding authority for
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executive actions in inexplicit congressional statutes and,
when it intervenes to enforce constitutional rights, the
Court’s remedies may well be procedural, nuanced, and
modest.
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